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Abstract. We investigate the use of automata theory to model strategies for nonzero-sum two- 
person games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We are particularly interested in infinite tournaments 
of such games. In the case of finite-state strategies (such as the well-known strategies ALL D or 
TIT FOR TAT) we use graph traversal techniques to show the existence of a (nonterminating) 
procedure for detecting our oppone,rt’s strategy and developing an “optimal” defense. We also 
investigate counter machine and Turing machine strategies. We show that the optimal defense to 
a counter machine strategy need not be finite-state, thus disproving a previous conjecture. We 
show that determining an optimal defense to an arbitrary Turmg machine strategy is undecidable. 
Consider the following nonzero-sum two-person game, called the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, given by the payoff matrix in Fig. 1. (In this description we follow closely 
the presentation given by Hofstadter [5].) In the payoff matrix with (i, j)-entry 
(P( i, j), Q( i, j)), P(i, j) represents the payoff to player X when X chooses move i 
and Y chooses move j. Similarly, Q( i, j) represents the payoff to player Y 
Fig. 1. Fig. 2. 
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The origin of the term Prisoner’s Dilemma comes from the following hypothetical 
situation: Suppose you and an accomplice attempt o commit a crime and are caught. 
The prosecuting attorney offers each of you, independently, the following “deal”. 
If neither of you confesses (i.e., you both cooperate with each other), you will both 
be convicted and will each serve two years in prison. However, if either of you 
confesses (defects against your partner) and the other does not, the one who confesses 
will be released and the other will serve five years. If you both confess you will 
serve four years. This situation can be described by the matrix of Fig. 2 where 
(-x, -y) means that you get x years in jail and your accomplice gets y years. If 
you add five to each element in Fig. 2 you get the original matrix of Fig. 1, referred 
to as the canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix. 
The dilemma of this game arises from the following analysis. If Y chooses C (to 
cooperate) the best choice for X is D (to defect), for X will then win 5 instead of 
3. If Y chooses D then X still does best by choosing 0, winning 1 instead of 0. 
Consequently, the best choice for X is to defect regardless of what Y does. The 
same analysis for player Y indicates that Y should also defect. Consequently, both 
players receive 1 unit when they both could have received 3 units by mutual 
cooperation. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been used by Axelrod and Hamilton 123 and by 
Hofstadter [S] to study the evolution of cooperation. Imagine that X and Y play 
an infinite sequence, or tournament, of games, each using the past history of the 
other player to determine its next move. The general condition for a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is a payoff matrix of the form given in Fig. 3, where R is the reward for 
mutual cooperation, T is the temptation to defect, P is the punishment for mutual 
defection, and S is the sucker’s payoff. The interesting case occurs when (1) 
T > R > P > S and (2) $, T+ S) < R. The first condition gives the dilemma. The 
second guarantees that if the two players get locked into out-of-phase alternations 
(i.e., on one move X defects and Y cooperates, on the next move X cooperates 
and Y defects, etc.) then both players will do worse than with mutual cooperation. 
Fig. 3. 
We will <xamii- = bvarious strategies for playing such a tournament using standard 
computing devices, specifically, Turing Machines, counter machines and finite-state 
automata. In this model a player will choose a move, be informed of the other 
player’s move, thzn perform some computatior, to choose its next move. 
On the inference of strategies 7 
A finite-state strategy for player X can be represented by a directed graph similar 
to the well-known state diagram. Each vertex of the graph is labelled with the choice 
of player X. Each directed edge is labelled with a choice of player Y So an edge 
labelled y, joining vertices x1 to x2 represents the fact that if player X is in the state 
indicated by the vertex labelled x1 then it will choose move x1 and if player Y makes 
a corresponding move of y1 then player X next chooses move x2. 
Various strategies for playing tournaments of the Prisoner% Dilemma were 
examined by Axelrod and subsequently by Hofstadter. Some of the simplest (and 
most interesting) of them are finite-state. We give a few strategies taken from 
Hofstadter [S] along with their corresponding automata. 
ALL D: Defect every time (Fig. 4). ALL C is defined similarly. 
MRS (massive retaliatory strike): Cooperate until Y defects, then defect every time 
(Fig. 5). 
TIT FOR TAR Cooperate on the first move, then mimic Y’s last move (Fig. 6). In 
computer tournaments TIT FOR TAT was found to be an extremely successful 
strategy (see [ 33). 
We also introduce another interesting strategy which seems intuitively reasonable. 
TOT TIT FOR TAT= Cooperate if Y has cooperated at least as often as it has 
defected. Note that this is not a good strategy in practice. An optimal defense against 
this strategy is to alternately cooperate and defect. We are interested in this strategy 
because it is not finite-state, but it can be modeled with a counter machine which 
uses the counter to keep track of the difference between the number of times Y 
cooperated and the number of times it defected. 
In this paper we apply the techniques of Richards and Swart [7] for graph traversal 
and identification to attempt o solve the following problems: 
(1) Determines Y’s strategy, by playing a tournament as X, 
Fig. 4. Fig. 5. 
C 
Fig. 6. 
8 C. Swat-t, D. Richards 
(2) Given Y’s strategy, produce an optimal strategy (or defense) for X, 
We assume that each player is using a deterministic strategy. We assume that 
each strategy can be modeled by a transducer, specifically either a finite-state machine 
(FSM), a counter machine (CM), or a Turing machine (TM). The input to the 
transducer represents he Y move and the output represents the subsequent X move. 
2. Terminology 
The following notation, similar to Trakhtenbrot and Barzdin’ 193 is helpful. Each 
player’s strategy produces a sequence of moves which may depend on its particular 
opponent. Let the moves of player X be given by X vs Y = x1, x2,. . . and let the 
moves of player Y be given by Y vs X = y, , p, . . . . Then for i 2 2, Xi depends on 
Yl,Y2,*=*,Yi--1, and yj depends on x1, x2, . . . , Xi-l. Suppose X and Y have each 
chosen their strategies. We define the pa_voff sequence P(X vs Y) = PI(X vs Y), 
P2(X vs Y), . . . , where Pi(X vs Y) is P(x,, yi), i.e., the payoff to player X after the 
ith move in the tournament. 
For convenience, we often identify players with their strategies. 
Next we must determine what we mean by a good strategy for X playing in an 
infinite tournament with Y. Simply adding the total payoffs to X is inadequate since 
this sum is usually infinite. We suggest he following definition. Consider two 
strategies X1 and X2 against a given strategy for player Y. Then strategy X1 dominates 
X2 with respect o Y, X, 3 y X2, if and only if there exists an noa 1 such that for 
all nan,, 
i: 8(X, vs Y)a f p,(X,vs Y). 
i=l i= 1 
This means that after some point, the total payoff to X, is never less than the total 
payoff to X2. The reason for not demanding that each partial sum dominate is to 
allow initial sacrifices which eventually provide a large payoff. A strategy X is 
strongly optimal with respect o Y if for every strategy X’, X 3 yX’. As we shall 
show below, a strongly optimal strategy need not exist. 
It is sometimes possible to prove another form of optimality. The (“worst-case 
average”) value of a strategy 
1 n 
V(X vs Y) = lim inf - 1 Pi(X vs Y). 
n-2 n i=l 
Since each term in the partial sum is bounded above and below by values in the 
payoff matrix the averages of the partial sums are always bounded. If we do not 
take the infimum, the limit may fail to exist; the average sums do not diverge but 
may oscillate between two finite values. We say that X is value optimal against Y 
if the value of X is at least as large as the value of any other strategy X’ against Y. 
In the following, when there is no chance of confusion, we shall refer to value 
optimal strategies imply as optimal. 
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3. Strategy inference 
Suppose player X tries to determine player Y’s strategy by playing a tournament 
against Y. This problem lies in the area of inductive inference, for which the 
fundamental reference is [4]. A good survey of the field may be found in [ 11. Strategy 
identification is very similar to the “black box identification” found in [4, Section 
51 and falls wit in the general model of identification suggested by Section 6 of the 
same paper. 
As is the case with graph traversal in [7), there are some inherent limitations to 
any attempt at strategy identification. 
(1) Cardinality: There are uncountably many strategies, so no procedure can 
identify all strategies. 
(2) Termination: For any finite sequence of moves by Y there are infinitely many 
different continuations possible, even when Y’s strategy is known to be finite-state. 
Therefore, X can never know it has successfully determined Y’s strategy. 
(3) Reachability: In general, Y’s strategy may be represented by a directed 
(possibly infinite) graph with edges labelled by the opponent’s moves. Unless this 
graph is strongly connected it may be that no sequence of moves by X could explore 
all the states of Y’s strategy and therefore its identification would be impossible. 
We therefore consider it sufficient o identify one strongly connected component of 
the strategy. This is essentially what Gold refers to as “weak learnability”. 
A very general approach for inferring a given strategy is the following. First we 
develop a procedure for generating a list of all strategies. (For example, for finite-state 
strategies it is possible to generate simpler strategies before more complex ones, 
according to the number of states used to describe the strategy.) These strategies 
are produced as needed below. We initialize by selecting the first strategy on the 
list as a candidate strategy S,. We then repeat the following pair of steps forever. 
Step 1: Choose Alternate Strategy. Find the next strategy on the list which is 
consistent with the results of the tournament as played so far and which is distinguish- 
able from S,. Call this strategy S,, the alternate strategy. 
Step 2: Eliminate One Strategy. Generate a finite distinguishing sequence of plays 
which will differentiate S, from S,. Run this sequence againt the actual strategy to 
eliminate either S, or S,. Update S, as necessary. 
Certain conditions must hold for this procedure to be valid. 
(1) Possible strategies must be enumerable. This is true for strategies given by 
finite-state machines and counter machines. Note that the enumerated strategies 
must be total functions. 
(2) The equivalence of two given strategies must be decidable. For games with 
only two possible moves we can immediately reduce this problem to the standard 
machine quivalence problem by considering one move to correspond to an accepting 
state, the other to a nonaccepting state. The equivalence problem for finite-state 
machines is well known to be decidable. Valiant and Paterson [lo] have shown that 
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the equivalence problem for (deterministic) counter automata is decidable. The 
equivalence problem for Turing machines is well known to be undecidable. 
(3) A distinguishing sequen,, me for nonequivalent machines must be found. If two 
machines are known to be nonequivalent, such a finite sequence can always be 
found in an “off-line” manner. For example, thp algorithm could generate all 
sequences in lexicographical order and test them by simulating the effect of each 
sequence on the two machines. 
This analysis gives us the following result. 
Theorem 3.1. A (nonterminating) procedure xists for identgying acfinite-state strategy 
or a counter machine strategy. 
4. Optimal defenses 
In this section we suppose tne strategy of Y has been identified. What defense 
Lould X choose to play with Y? We have positive results when Y uses a finite-state 
strategy and, not surprisingly, negative results when Y uses a Turing machine 
strategy. We have resolved a previous conjecture concerning counter machine 
strategies. 
As we mentioned above, observe that a strongly optimal defense might not exist. 
For example, consider the following finite-state strategy for Y playing a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma given in Fig. 7. Y cooperates on the first move and then alternates between 
cooperation and defection. The first choice of X determines Y’s second move. 
Specifically, Y’s second move repeats X’s first move. After the first move Y’s moves 
are independent of X’s choices. X has only two reasonable strategies in the sense 
that any alternate strategy is dominated by one of these. They are 
X, : cooperate on move 1, then defect forever, 
X2: defect forever. 
Fig. 7. 
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The payoff sequences of the two strategies are 
P(X, vs Y) = R, T, P, K P,. . .) P(X,vsY)=T,P,T,P,T,.... 
The conditions of a Prisoner’s Dilemma give us T > R > I? Since R > P, X1 dominates 
X2 after every even move, and since T> R, X2 dominates X1 after every odd move. 
Therefore, a strongly optimal defense does not exist. 
However, we are able to show, using a pumping argument, hat a value optimal 
defense exists against a finite-state strategy. 
Theorem 4.1. A value optimal defense against an FSM strategy exists and isfinite-state. 
Furthermore, an algorithm exists for determining an optimal defense if a description 
of the FSM strategy is given. 
Proof. Suppose Y uses a finite-state strategy. Form the graph corresponding to Y’s 
strategy. Give each edge in the graph a weight equal to the payoff to X if that edge 
is chosen. Find a simple cycle which is reachable from the start state ab?d which 
has the largest average payoff to X, i.e., find a cycle whose payoff per edge is 
maximal. Note that there may be several such cycles. Let the average payoff of such 
a cycle be p. Define the strategy X to be one which takes Y to such a cycle and 
then stays in this cycle. Clearly, the value of this strategy is p, and since the sequence 
of states generated is ultimately periodic, the strategy is finite-state. Next, let X’ be 
any strategy against Y. Consider thz set of states into which X’ takes Y. At least 
one state, q, must occur infinitely often. So the behavior of the finite-state machine 
for Y consists of an initial sequence of moves ending in state q followed by an 
infinite sequence of (not necessarily distinct) cycles taking q to q. Since each of 
these cycles has an average payoff at most p, the value of this strategy V(X’ vs Y) 
is at most p. Therefore, since V(X vs Y) 3 V(X’ vs Y), X is value optimal. 0 
Next we consider counter machine strategies. Notice that an optimal defense 
against he CM strategy TOT TIT FOR TAT is CDCDCD. . . , which is finite-state. 
Observations uch as this led to the conjecture [8] that a value optimal defense 
against a CM strategy exists and is finite-state. We now give a counter-example to
that conjecture along with a theorem that shows that nearly optimal finite-state 
defenses exist against CM strategies. 
Recall that a counter machine is a pushdown automaton which has only one 
stack symbol, with the exception of a bottom-of-stack marker (see [S]). The machine 
can push the symbol on the stack (increment he counter), pop the symbol from 
the stack (decrement a nonrero counter) and check to see if the top stat 
is the bottom-of-stack marker (if the count is zero). The CM either reads a symbol 
before each counter operation, or it makes an “E-move”, i.e., it changes tate and 
performs an operation without reading any input. 
We can use a generalization of the graph for finite-state strategies to represent 
CM strategies. Each vertex corresponds to the C . A labelled vertex 
corresponds to the player’s move in the game, as n unlabelled vertex 
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corresponds to a state for an e-move. Note that the input, the opponent’s last move, 
does not change at an unlabelled vertex since the player has not made a move at 
this point. Our examples do not use E-moves. An edge joining two vertices is labelled 
by a triple. The first component is the opponent’s move, just as with a finite-state 
strategy. The second component is a test for zero value on the counter (0 zero, -0 
not zero). The final component is the action to be taken on the counter (+ add 1 
to the counter, - subtract 1 from the counter, 0 no action). Using this notation, 
consider the CM strategy for the Prisoner’s Dilemma for player Y given by Fig. 8. 
All unspecified edges take Y to an ALL D state. 
Fig. 8. 
A simple interpretation of Y’s strategy can be given. Whenever the counter is 
zero, Y cooperates once and then defects once, incrementing the counter both times. 
If X cooperated on both these moves then Y continues to cooperate; at this point 
Y expects X to cooperate and it increments the counter as long as X does. When 
X defects Y continues to cooperate but decrements the counter. Y expects X to 
continue to defect until the counter is zero. When the counter again becomes zero 
Y begins this action all over again. 
We make the following observations about the possible strategies for X playing 
against his particular Y. Intuitively, X must periodically make a small initial sacrifice 
(by cooperating when it knows Y will defect) whenever the counter changes form 
0 to I. Formally we assert he r lowing. 
(1) If X cooperates n times and then defects n times it receives a payoff 
R + S+ (n -2) R + nT. IPI this sequence of 2n moves, X receives an average pay- 
off of $(R + T) -(R -S)/2n. So the defense C2D2C3D3C4D4.. has a value of 
$( R + T). (Note that X only achieves the value of its defense in the limit since it 
must make infinitely many (but widely spaced) one-move sacrifices.) 
(2) We say a defense for X is canonical if it is of the form Ci~D’Ci2Di&Di~. . . , 
where each 4 2 2. X can choose to adopt ALL C at any point when Y expects it to 
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cooperate, and X will have a defense with value R. Any other deviation from the 
canonical defense will cause Y to play ALL D at some point; hence X will have a 
defense with a value of only R 
(3) Consequently, any defense for X which is not canonical has values less than 
i( R -+ T) and is therefore not optimal. Further, any canonical defense for which 
lim infj+,, ij = 00 is optimal. 
(4) For any finite-state defense there is a maximum value: n such that C”D” is 
part of the canonical defense, and therefore its value is at most $( R + 7’) - (R - S)/2n, 
and it is not optimal. 
Less obvious is the fact that any optimal defense to Y’s strategy is not a CM 
strategy. The intuition behind this result is that X must generate longer and longer 
sequences and also must know when Y has a zero counter; a single counter cannot 
do this simultaneous bookkeeping. 
Lemma 4.2. A CM with constant input has a jixed bound (depending only on its 
number of states) on the number of steps from one zero counter to the next zero counter. 
Proof. Define a configuration to be the pair consisting of the state and counter 
value. It is easy to show that there exists such a bound on the number of steps, 
such that after that many steps either the CM will loop through a set of configurations 
or the CM will loop with the counter growing without bound. In either case there 
is a contradiction. Cl 
Theorem 4.3. There exists a CM strategy with an optimal defense but fir which no 
optimal defense is a CM strategy. 
Proof. We show that the strategy in Fig. 8 is such a strategy. Assume that X has 
an optimal CM strategy against Y. As discussed above, X lmust play along with Y 
and so must produce, for arbitrary p, a sequence of more thsn p C’s before switching 
to a sequence of more than p D’s and then switching back to a C, and throughout 
the input is constant (after the second C). The CM needs some internal cue to 
switch its output since the input is constant. First, notice that for p large enough 
the CM must produce a zero counter during the C’s since, otherwise, by using a 
pumping argument, it follows that the CM’s behavior must loop and it will not 
change to a sequence of D’s. Similarly, during the sequence of D’s a zero counter 
must occur. Second, by the same reasoning used in the proof of Lemma 4.2, there 
is a fixed bound on the number of moves between the last time the counter is zero 
in a sequence of D’s and the next time that X chooses a C. This follows because, 
with constant, input, there is a bound on the number of distinct configurations that 
the CM can attain before reaching the configuration in which it next chooses to 
cooperate. Hence the CM will produce a series of zero counters while the input is 
kept consta.nt. At least one of these zero counters occurs on a C choice and one 
occurs a bounded distance from the end of the choices. 
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mere are two cases. If for all p it produces a number of zero CO 
less than or equal to the number of states then, for large enough p, we can find a 
pair of consecutive zero counter configurations eparated by a number of steps 
larger than any fixed bound. This contradicts Lemma 4.2. Therefore, for some p, it 
produces more zero counters than states. In this case some state must repeat in the 
zero counter configuration. Therefore, the CM must loop. Its looping behavior may 
be all G’s, all D’s, or a combination of the two, but in all cases it does not play a 
canonical defense. Cl 
Recall that X can get as close as it wishes to the optimal value of this game by 
simply choosing a large enough n and playing the finite-state strategy C “D”C “D” . . . . 
This situation generalizes to the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.4. Suppose player Y uses a CM strategy and suppose X has a value optimal 
defense against Y with value u. Let 8 > 0 be given. l%en X has a Jinite-state strategy 
against Y with value at least v - 8. 
Proof. Suppose X plays its value optimal defense against Y Then Y’s moves can 
be described by a sequence of configuration pairs (Si, hi), where Si is the state of Y 
and hi is the height of the counter. There are two cases ‘0 consider. 
Case (a) hi = 0 infinitely often (i.e., the counter is zero infinitely often). Since the 
CM has only finitely many states there must be some state, say si, such that the pair 
(Sis 0) occws infinitely often. Therefore, the sequence of Y’s moves can be partitioned 
into a finite initial segment and infinitely many segments, each of finite length and 
each starting with (Si, 0) and ending just before the next (si, 0) (see Fig. 9). We 
claim that at least one of these segments has an average payoff per move of at least 
v - E. If every segment had average payoff strictly less than v - E then by adding 
all the payoffs of all the segments we would get a value for X’s optimal strategy 
h 
Fig. 9. 
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which is bounded 
segment has value 
same as the value I 
above by v-e contrary to hype %~is. Suppose that the kth 
at least V- E. Then by choosing a strategy for X which is the 
optimal one for the first k - 1 segments and then repeatedly 
choosing the moves which produced segment k, we get a defense which has value 
at least v - 8. Since this strategy is ultimately periodic, it is finite-state. 
Case (b) hi = 0 finitely often. A similar argument works. There must be some state 
si and some infinite subsequence of configurations which begins somewhere after 
the last time the counter is 0, (Si, go), (sj, g&, . . . such that gj s gi+l for each j (see 
Fig. 10). Again, the sequence of Y’s moves can be partitioned into a finite initial 
segment and infinitely many segments, each of finite length, starting with (si, go), 
Csi, gl), l l l l As before, at least one of these segments, ay the kth, has value at least 
v - E. Choose a strategy for X which is the same as the value optimal one for the 
first k - 1 segments and then repeatedly choosing the moves which produced segment 
I&. Notice that segment k started with the counter at value gk+ and ended with value 
gk and that at no time did the counter become zero while Y was playing in this 
segment. When the moves which produced segment k are repeated, the new segment 
k + 1 starts with the counter at value gk and ends with the counter at value 2gk - gk_l. 
Since gk-l G gk, the initial counter value at the start of segment k + 1 is at least as 
large as the initial counter at the start of segment k, so all moves in the new segment 
have counter values at least as large as corresponding moves in the kth segment. 
Hence the counter is never zero in segment k-I- 1. So the behavior of Y in playing 
segment k + 1 is identical to its behavior in segment k. In particular, the average 
payoff per move is the same. Continuing this sequence of moves gives us an ultimately 






Finally, we consider general Turing machine strategies. We extend the technique 
used for FSM strategies to show that a general TM strategy need not have a value 
optimal defense, and then show that even if a value optimal or strongly optimal 
defense exists, finding it is undecidable. 
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Thmrem 4.5. There is a TM strategy which has neither a strongly optimal nor a value 
optimal defense. 
Proof. Consider the following strategy for Y which after an initial section follows 
a fixed loop. Initially, Y defects and continues to defect as long as X cooperates. 
Once X defects, Y switches to its fixed loop. The loop consists of n C’s followed 
by one D, where n is the number of initial cooperations X made. If X never defects 
the value of its defense is just S. The other defenses can be put into equivalence 
classes according to n. Clearly, each equivalence class is dominated by the defense 
CnDco. The value of each of these defenses is nT/(n + 1) + P/(n + 1). Therefore, X 
can choose from any one of an infinite sequence of defenses with increasing value, 
but no single value optimal or strongly optimal defense exists. Cl 
Our final results in this area show that it is hopeless to work with TM strategies, 
as might be expected. 
Theorem 4.6. There is no algorithm which, given a d,?xription of a TM strategy, 
produces a value (or strongly) optimal defense, even ifit is known that such a defense 
exists. 
Proof. We show that the existence of such a strategy would imply the solution to 
the blank tape halting problem. Consider the following Turing machine strategy for 
player Y, which uses the description of an arbitrary Turing machine H as additional 
input and plays a Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament. Y cooperates on the first play. 
If X cooperates, Y plays TIT FOR TAT. IIf X defects, Y uses a scratch tape to 
simulate H when started on a blank tape. Y defects once for each step H makes. 
If H halts then Y cooperates in all future plays. Again, X has two reasonable 
strategies, completely determined by its first move. If X chooses to cooperate on 
its first move, Y -will play TIT FOR TAT. The optimal defense to this strategy is to 
cooperate forever, (ALL C), so if X chooses this, its payoff sequence is R, R, R, . . . . 
If, however, X defects on its first move, then Y’s future moves are independent of 
X’s, so the best strategy for X is ALL D. This strategy has payoff T, P, P, . . . if H 
never halts, since then Y will play ALL D forever. The same strategy has payoff 
T,p,p,...,p, T, T, T,... with n P’S if H halts after n moves, since after n defections, 
Y will cooperate forever. So the value of ALL C is K and the value of ALL D is 
either P if H never halts, or 7 if H halts. Recall that P c R c T so that all D is 
optimal if H halts and ALL C is optimal if H does not halt. El 
Corollary 4.7. It is undecidable whether an optimal defense exists for a given TM 
strategy. 
roof. Augment he construction in the preceding proof in the case when H halts. 
Instead of having Y play ALL C, have Y play the strategy in the proof of Theorem 
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4.5 when H halts. So if H does not halt, there is an optimal defense for X with 
value R. If H does halt then there is no optimal defense, but instead a sequence 
of strategies with values approaching T. Cl 
5. Combining identification with optimal defense 
In [7] we combined graph identification with graph traversal. A similar situation 
occurs in the case of game strategies. When methods exist for identifying a strategy 
and computing an optimal defense, then in some sense it is possible to do both 
simultaneously. The basic idea is straightforward. Modify the identification pro- 
cedure to alternate between identification and defense playing. Every time the 
identification procedure finishes one pass through the steps Choose Alternate §trategy 
and Eliminate One Strategy (i.e., it has either reconfirmed the old candidate strategy 
or selected a new candidate strategy), it computes the optimal defense against he 
candidate strategy and spends some time playing that strategy. Since the procedure 
eventually identifies the correct strategy, it eventually plays the correct defense. The 
major difficulty with this approach is assuring that more moves are spent playing 
than testing. For instance, it is conceivable that each new test takes more moves 
than all the previous moves made up to that test. In some cases, one can prevent 
this by predicting the maximum length of the next distinguishing sequence and 
playing long enough in advance. By careful prediction, one can assure that any 
desired fraction (less than 1) of the time is spent playing the defense and that in 
the limit this fraction can be made to go to 1. 
In the case of finite-state strategies Uris goal is achievable. Suppose A&, the 
automaton for the candidate strategy SC has n states and that M,, the automaton 
for the next consistent, distinguishable alternate strategy has m states. Before playing 
the optimal defense against strategy S,, for each pair (i, j) we compute a sequence 
which distinguishes MC starting in state i from Ma starting in state j. Whenever we 
finish playing, we know that one of these sequences will distinguish SC from S,. 
Therefore, the longest of these nm sequences gives us a uniform upper bound on 
our next test sequence. We can use this bound to determine how to play our defense 
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